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Although policymakers have increasingly turned to provider report cards as a tool to improve health
care quality, existing studies provide mixed evidence that they influence consumer choices.  We examine
the effects of providing consumers with quality information in the context of fertility clinics providing
Assisted Reproductive Therapies (ART).  We report three main findings.  First, clinics with higher
birthrates had larger market shares after relative to before the adoption of report cards.  Second, clinics
with a disproportionate share of young, relatively easy-to-treat patients had lower market shares after
adoption versus before.  This suggests that consumers take into account information on patient mix
when evaluating clinic outcomes.  Third, report cards had larger effects on consumers and clinics from
states with ART insurance coverage mandates.  We conclude that quality report cards have potential
to influence provider behavior in this setting.
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I.  Introduction 
 
Health policy makers and researchers have long debated the extent to which 
"report cards" – public disclosure of comparative information on the performance of 
doctors, hospitals, and insurers – affect the allocation of consumers to health care 
providers.  On one hand are studies that find that more highly rated hospitals have higher 
market shares (Mukamel and Mushlin 1998; Cutler, Huckman et al. 2004) and that report 
cards have an effect, albeit a small one, on health plan enrollment (Beaulieu 2002; 
Scanlon, Chernew et al. 2002; Wedig and Tai-Seale 2002; Dafny and Dranove 2005; Jin 
and Sorensen 2005; Chernew, Gowrisankaran et al. 2007).  On the other hand are studies 
that find that report cards have a more marginal impact on markets for health services 
(Schneider and Epstein 1998; Mukamel, Mushlin et al. 2000; Romano and Zhou 2004).  
Report cards may be ineffective in this context because they are difficult to understand, 
they provide information that consumers already know, or they provide information that 
is irrelevant to consumers (Marshall, Shekelle et al. 2000).   
From the perspective of public policy, determining whether report cards affect 
provider market share is important.  Although the absence of a link between ratings and 
market share does not rule out an effect of report cards on quality, one of the main 
mechanisms by which report cards may improve quality is by reallocating demand from 
low- to high-ranked providers.  Yet, despite this importance, estimation of the causal 
effects of report cards on market share remains an open empirical issue.  Not only do 
existing studies produce mixed findings on the effect of report cards on provider market 
share, but, due to data limitations, virtually all of the studies in the literature rely on 
untestable assumptions to identify the effect of interest.     2
In this paper, we examine the effects of report cards on the market shares of 
fertility clinics.  We estimate the effect of public disclosure of a clinic’s three-year lagged 
birth rate, a measure of quality, on clinic market share after relative to before birth rates 
were disclosed to consumers.  Because we observe the three-year lagged birth rate for the 
vast majority of clinics in the U.S. both before and after public reporting occurred, we are 
able to identify the effect of disclosure with a transparent "difference-in-difference" 
strategy that requires fewer restrictive assumptions than other existing analyses.  We also 
observe an additional, more recent measure of quality -- the one-year lagged birth rate -- 
that was never publicly disclosed to consumers through report cards.  This allows us to 
control for the possibility that the effect of other sources of information for consumers 
changed contemporaneously with the adoption of the report card, and assess the impact of 
disclosure per se.    
We also offer two novel extensions to the literature on report cards.  Because 
clinics had to disclose information on both their birth rates and the age distribution of 
their patients, we are able to test whether consumers take into account patient mix when 
evaluating a clinic's outcomes.  The birth rate of younger women undergoing fertility 
treatment is widely known to be higher than the birth rate of older women; for this 
reason, the age distribution of a clinic's patient population captures the extent to which its 
birth rate may be driven by underlying patient characteristics rather than the skill or effort 
of its workers.  Finally, the nationwide scope of our data, combined with the existence of 
differences across states in regulations affecting insurance coverage for fertility 
treatment, enables us to test whether the effects of public reporting differ based on the 
regulatory environment.       3
II.  Previous literature 
A key issue in identifying the effects of report cards on provider market share is 
distinguishing the effect of information provided by the report card from that of 
information that consumers have from other sources.  In particular, consumers are likely 
to have information on provider quality from a variety of sources other than the report 
card, but information from these other sources is generally not observable to the 
econometrician.  Depending on the correlation between unobserved information on 
quality and the information disclosed by the report card, estimates of the impact of the 
report card may either overstate or understate its true causal effect.   
Papers in the existing literature impose a variety of assumptions to address this 
concern.  One set of papers examines the relationship between reported quality and 
market share after the implementation of a report card (Cutler, Huckman et al. 2004; 
Howard and Kaplan 2006).  These studies define the effect of the report card as the 
correlation between market share and reported quality over time, holding constant 
provider characteristics and/or provider fixed effects.  Although this identification 
strategy allows for correlation between reported and time-invariant, unobserved quality, 
it requires the assumption that changes in reported quality are uncorrelated with changes 
in unobserved quality information that consumers had from other sources.   
A second set of studies analyzes the market shares of providers after relative to 
before the adoption of a report card (Mennemeyer, Morrisey et al. 1997; Beaulieu 2002; 
Scanlon, Chernew et al. 2002; Wedig and Tai-Seale 2002; Dafny and Dranove 2005; 
Chernew, Gowrisankaran et al. 2007).  These studies define the effect of the report card 
as the difference in the change in market shares, after versus before adoption, between   4
providers who are highly-rated and those who are poorly-rated by the report card.  Like 
the studies in the first set, this identification strategy allows for time-invariant correlation 
between reported and unobserved quality.  However, because none of these studies have 
information on quality from before the adoption of the report card, they all either assume 
that the unobserved quality of providers did not change contemporaneously with the 
adoption of the report card, or at the least, assume a specific functional form for how it 
would have changed in the absence of the report card (e.g., Dafny and Dranove (2005) 
and Chernew, Gowrisankaran et. al (2007)).   
In a unique approach, Jin and Sorensen (2005) examine how health plan market 
share varies with quality under a voluntary reporting system.  They observe a published 
quality measure for reporting plans as well as an identical (unpublished) measure for non-
reporters.  They define the effect of the report card as the difference between reporters 
and non-reporters in the correlation between quality and market share.  Although this 
identification strategy allows for correlation between changes in reported and unobserved 
quality, it requires the assumption that this correlation is the same for reporters and non-
reporters.  Because health plans may be more likely to report when reporting leads to an 
increase in market share, and less likely to report when doing so would lead to a decrease 
in market share, this assumption may be incorrect.   
In our study, we observe quality measures and market share both before and after 
a mandatory report card disclosed this information.  Only Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002), 
who compare the relationship between consumer satisfaction with health plans and 
enrollment rates in the FEHBP, after relative to before the FEHBP widely distributed 
satisfaction ratings, have a similar research design. They find that the distribution of   5
satisfaction information affects plan choices, all else held constant, particularly for new 
employees.  Comparing the relationship between market share and quality measures 
before and after quality measures were disclosed allows for changes over time in provider 
quality that are correlated with the information provided by the report card, assuming 
only that the correlation between the quality measure and unobserved sources of 
information did not change contemporaneously with the adoption of the report card.   
While we use a research design similar to that of Wedig and Tai-Seale, an unusual 
feature of the setting we examine allows us to relax the assumption that the relationship 
between quality and market share is constant over time.  We not only observe reported 
quality both before and after its disclosure, but we also observe an additional measure of 
quality that was never disclosed to consumers.  Because fertility clinic reporting only 
informed consumers about the birth rate with a three-year lag, we use the one-year lagged 
birthrate as a control for unobserved quality.  Since there is no reason for the less current 
reported information to affect consumer decision-making other than the reporting 
mechanism, hypothesis tests of the post-pre change in the estimated impact of the 3-year 
lagged birth rate, holding constant the 1-year lagged birth rate, is a strong test of the link 
between reporting and market share.   
Our study also contributes to the existing literature in a number of other ways.  
First, we examine the effect of reporting birth rates, an objective measure of health 
outcomes, on the market share of a provider.  Second, the report card includes both the 
unadjusted clinic birthrate and the age distribution of each clinic's patients, allowing us to 
test whether consumers consider information on patient mix when evaluating health care 
providers.  In addition, participation in quality reporting was mandatory and implemented   6
nationwide, reducing concerns regarding unobserved characteristics of those who choose 
to participate in voluntary settings and concerns regarding differences between states that 
adopt and do not adopt quality reporting in analyses of state-level mandatory initiatives.  
Finally, differences across states in regulations affecting insurance coverage for fertility 
treatment enable us to test whether the effects of public reporting differ based on the 
regulatory environment.       
 
III.  Fertility Clinics and Quality Report Cards  
We study the effects of quality report cards in the context of fertility clinics which 
provide Assisted Reproductive Therapies (ART) for the treatment of infertility.  Over the 
last 30 years, the development of drugs to stimulate egg production in women and the 
development of procedures to promote insemination both in utero (artificial insemination) 
and in the laboratory have led to dramatic improvements in the treatment of infertility.  
Our analysis focuses on ART in which a physician surgically removes a woman’s eggs, 
combines the eggs with sperm in a laboratory, and returns one or more developing 
embryos to a women’s uterus. Since the first ART cycle was performed in the U.S. in 
1981, utilization has grown dramatically.  In 2004, 411 fertility clinics performed 
127,977 cycles resulting in 36,760 live births of 49,458 infants (CDC 2005). 
The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), an organization of 
ART providers, began collecting data from its members on the utilization and outcomes 
for ART procedures in 1989.  Initially, participation by clinics was voluntary, although 
the vast majority of ART clinics both were members of SART and reported their 
information.  During this period, distribution of the information was limited.  Consumers   7
were able to access the reports only by requesting a hard copy directly from SART.  
However, The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, which required 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to publish information about 
success rates for all U.S. clinics, made the collection and dissemination of this 
information mandatory.  The first year of data collection for the mandatory reporting 
system was 1995, and the first report was publicly released by the CDC in December of 
1997.
1  In 1998, clinic-level information on ART utilization and outcomes became 
publicly available and easily accessible on the CDC website.  Every year since then, the 
CDC has updated their website with a new set of three-year lagged data.   
A primary concern motivating the passage of the law was that patients were 
uninformed about the relatively low probability of conceiving with ART.  In 1990, 16% 
of cycles resulted in a live birth (Medical Research International and SART 1992).  
Concerns about the low likelihood of success with ART were compounded by the high 
cost of treatment.  A single cycle costs approximately $10,000 (Neumann, Gharib et al. 
1994; Collins 2001), and treatment is rarely covered by insurance.  Because many cycles 
do not result in a live birth, the average cost per delivery is over $50,000 (Collins 2001).  
In 1987, a group of leading endocrinologists published an article in the primary clinical 
journal in the field questioning whether existing credentialing mechanisms of ART 
providers were adequate, whether providers were performing ART on clinically 
appropriate patients, and whether providers were truthfully informing patients about their 
likely success with ART (Blackwell, Carr et al. 1987).       
The report card was intended to address these issues by providing patients with 
accurate information on their likelihood of conceiving with ART.  The initial reports 
                                                 
1 http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/1997pres/971218c.html   8
published clinic-level birth rates by age and type of embryo (i.e., ART using fresh 
embryos from non-donor eggs, frozen embryos from non-donor eggs, or embryos from 
donor eggs).  The report also provided information on the distribution of treatment 
technologies used at the clinic (i.e., IVF/GIFT/ZIFT and ICSI)
2, the proportion of patients 
with different diagnoses, utilization by age and cycle type, the average number of 
embryos transferred per cycle, and rates of multiple births per transfer (see Figure 1 for 
an example). 
The high cost of treatment and the lack of insurance coverage also generated 
support for laws mandating that health insurance cover fertility treatments.  A number of 
states enacted mandates during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and Louisiana, New 
Jersey, and New York passed legislation as recently as 2001.  By reducing the out-of-
pocket price of treatment, the most comprehensive versions of these laws increased 
utilization of ART (Hamilton and McManus 2005; Bundorf, Henne et al. 2007).   
 
IV.  Methods 
Our basic empirical strategy is to compare the relationship between clinic market 
share and clinic birth rates before and after their public release.  The relationship between 
clinic market share and birth rate prior to public reporting serves as a control for the 
correlation between the information on the report card and information on quality 
consumers obtain from other sources.  The difference in this relationship between the 
                                                 
2 IVF (in vitro fertilization), GIFT (gamete intrafallopian transfer), and ZIFT (zygote intrafallopian 
transfer) are types of ART.  The vast majority of cycles are IVF.  For example, in 1999, 97% of fresh, non-
donor cycles were IVF.  ICSI (intracytoplasmic sperm injection) is a procedure used in combination with 
an ART cycle in which a single sperm is injected directly into an egg.   9
reporting and non-reporting periods represents the effect of public dissemination of this 
information on consumer choices.   
 
A.  Data 
The primary source of data is information reported by clinics to SART.  In 1989, 
SART, an affiliate of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), began a 
voluntary reporting system to collect clinic-level information about the utilization and 
outcomes of ART.  SART produced an annual report that provided clinic-level 
information for the vast majority of clinics operating in the U.S.  We obtained hard 
copies of these reports for the years 1989 to 1994 from SART.  After the implementation 
of mandatory reporting, this information became publicly available on the CDC website 
(http://www.cdc.gov/art/), where we obtained data from 1995 to 2003.  Using this 
dataset, we linked clinics over time based on their name and address.  This linkage 
allowed us to calculate three-year lagged performance measures for all clinics that 
operated from 1996 to 2003.
3   
We obtained information on annual area characteristics including the number of 
physicians per capita and the size of the population from the Area Resource File (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 2005). 
 Although 14 states had mandates in place related to the coverage of infertility 
treatments in 2003, the conditions of the mandates vary significantly based on the types 
of plans affected, the number and types of treatments covered, the cost-sharing associated 
with treatment, and the population to which the mandate applies.  Also, firms that self-
                                                 
3 We dropped market share data from 1992 to 1995 due to inconsistencies in the reporting of key variables 
during 1989 to 1992 which prevented us from obtaining consistent measures of lagged performance for 
these years.   10
insure are exempt from mandates in all states.  Because the effects of the mandates on 
utilization and outcomes of fertility treatments were concentrated among states adopting 
the most comprehensive versions of the laws (Bundorf, Henne et al. 2007), we considered 
only states with comprehensive versions of a mandate as having a law.  We defined a 
“comprehensive” mandate as a requirement that insurance companies, including health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs), provide coverage for the cost of diagnosis and 
treatment of infertility, including at least three cycles of ART, with few exclusions on the 
population covered by the mandate.  In practice, this definition differentiates between 
mandates that require generous coverage of ART from those that do not.  Five states had 
comprehensive mandates in place during our study including Illinois (1991), Maryland 
(1985), Massachusetts (1987), New Jersey (2001), and Rhode Island (1989).  We 
consider the mandates to be in effect in the year following their adoption.
4    
 
B.  Empirical Models 
Our basic models specify the market share of clinic i in metropolitan or 
micropolitan statistical area (MSA)
5 j in year t = 1996, …, 2003, Sijt, as a function of 
information that was ultimately disclosed by the report card, Zijt; information that was 
never disclosed to consumers by the report card, Wijt; clinic characteristics Vijt; and 
market characteristics Xjt.  The models include year fixed effects and allow the effects of 
                                                 
4 Although Maryland’s law limited coverage to couples who had experienced a 5-year history of infertility 
when it was initially adopted, it is not clear how strictly this was enforced.  In addition, this restriction was 
relaxed in 1994. 
5 A metropolitan statistical area has at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more population, plus adjacent 
territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measure by commuting 
ties, and a micropolitan statistical area is based on a similar definition but has at least one urban cluster of 
at least 10,000 but less than 50,000 population (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2005).   11
Zijt, Wijt, Vijt, and Xjt to vary after the publication of the report card (t = 1998, …, 2003) 









ijt jt ijt ijt ijt t ijt X V W Z t I X V W Z S ε γ φ δ β γ φ δ β α + + + + ⋅ > + + + + + = ) ( ) 1997 ( ln  (1) 
The vector Zijt includes two elements.  The first is the three-year lagged birth rate 
(live births per cycle), measured relative to the competitors of clinic i using the within-
MSA z-score: 
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As discussed above, quality is reported to consumers with a three-year lag; ART report 
cards were released at the very end of the calendar year and were based on data from 
cycles started during the year ending two years prior to the release date.  For example, the 
first report card was released in December of 1997 and included data from cycles started 
during 1995.  In our empirical work, we assume this information affected clinic market 
share during 1998.   
The second element of Zijt is the three-year lagged share of cycles received by 
women 40 years of age and under:
6   
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Z .    
The ART report cards disclose information on the share of cycles received by relatively 
young patients because it is a strong predictor of ART success.  For example, in the 1995 
report, rates of live births per cycle are approximately 25% until age 34 when they begin 
to steadily decline to less than 5% for women 43 and over (CDC 1997).  The report card 
                                                 
6 The reports do not present data on the distribution of cycles by patient age consistently over time.  We 
chose the definition of this variable to generate the most consistent definition over the years.  For 1995 and 
1996, this represents the portion of patients 39 and under.   12
explicitly provides information on this dimension of patient case mix in the form of both 
pregnancy rates by age and a clinic-level age standardized rate.  The three-year lagged 
birth rate in the empirical model, in contrast, represents the clinic’s aggregate 
performance, not adjusted for patient age.  Including both the raw birthrate and the 
proportion of relatively easy-to-treat patients allows us to independently assess the effects 
of disclosing patient case mix on consumer response.
7   
The vector Wijt includes two elements, the one-year lagged analogues to Zijt
1 and 
Zijt
2:   
  ( )
1 ,





t j t j i
ijt
rate birth
rate birth rate birth









t j t j i
ijt
patients young
patients young patients young
W .        
Because the one-year lagged quality measures were never disseminated through the 
report card, their correlation with market share serves as a control for changes over time 
in the relationship between quality and market share.  
The vector Vijt includes six elements.  The first, Vijt
1, is an indicator of whether the 
clinic entered the market within the prior two years.  Because three-year lagged 
performance is not available for these clinics, entrants are not included in the published 
report.  The second, Vijt
2, captures whether the clinic is an incumbent (i.e., had entered at 
                                                 
7 While an alternative to testing the effect of reported performance on market share would have been to 
base the birth rate z-score on the age adjusted rate, this specification is less flexible than the one we used 
because it would not have allowed us to separately identify the effect of patient mix on consumer choices.     13
least three years ago) who declined to report.
8  We set Zijt
1 = Zijt
2 = 0 if Vijt
1 = 1 or Vijt
2 = 
1.  The other elements of Vijt are indicator variables capturing whether the clinic is 
affiliated with a teaching hospital; is a member of the SART trade association; accepts 
single women; and accepts egg donors.
9 
Market characteristics Xjt include controls for the logarithm of the number of 
entrants, incumbents, and non-reporting incumbents in the MSA.  When there are no 
competitors of a given type, we set the value of the logarithm to zero and include a 
corresponding indicator variable.  We also include an indicator of whether a non-
reporting clinic exists in the market.   Xjt also includes the number of physicians per 
capita and the MSA population to control for differences across areas in demand for 
fertility treatment as well as year fixed effects to control for time trends common to all 
clinics. 
We estimate extended models which allow the effects of the report card to vary 
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where Mjt = 1 if market j in year t had a comprehensive mandate in effect.   
Finally, we estimate a variant of equations (1) and (2) that specify a clinic's 
number of cycles, Cijt, as a function of the number of cycles in the clinic's MSA, Cjt: 
                                                 
8 We identify these clinics in two ways.  First, the report card identifies clinics which chose not to 
participate in a given year, although this only applies to the years in which the report card was in effect.  
We also identify non-reporters based on the existence of a gap in their reporting history.   
9 For years in which clinics did not report characteristics due to circumstances such as mergers, we used 
clinic data from the closest available year.   14
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We report standard errors that allow for clustering at the MSA level.  By 
construction, MSA-level market share is not independent across clinics within an MSA; 
in addition, it is unlikely to be independent within MSAs over time.  MSA-clustered 
errors account for both of these concerns. 
We restrict the analysis to MSAs with more than one clinic.  Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics on the market for ART during the period we analyze.  From 1996 to 
2003, the number of reporting clinics grew from 300 to 398 and the number of cycles 
initiated grew from 49,600 to 86,753.  The average number of clinics per MSA increased 
from 2.73 to 3.31.  Although we restrict the sample to include only clinics in MSAs with 
at least two clinics, we include over 87% of cycles performed in both 1996 and 2003.  
Table 1 also demonstrates that our data include most clinics operating in the U.S.  
Approximately 12% of clinics did not report in 1996 and 2003.  Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics for the study sample, which includes only clinics in markets with at 
least two clinics. 
 
V.  Results   15
Table 3 reports selected estimates from a restricted version of equation (1) that 
excludes Wijt, the information that was never disclosed to consumers by the report card.  
According to this model (Column 1), the effect of birth rate on market share before the 
adoption of the report card is positive but not statistically significant.  The differential 
effect of birthrate post- versus pre-report cards, however, is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that measured performance had a larger, positive effect on market 
share when the information was publicly disseminated to consumers.   
This difference is economically important.  For example, a clinic that improves its 
birthrate z-score from the 25th to the 75th percentile, a 0.24 increase in our sample (not in 
any table), would experience a 12.6% percent greater increase in its market share after 
public reporting versus before.
10   
We also find that information on patient mix affected clinic market share 
differentially before and after mandatory public reporting.  Clinics that treat a 
disproportionate number of young patients relative to their competitors have statistically 
significantly lower market shares, after public reporting relative to before.  We interpret 
this as evidence that public reporting allowed consumers to adjust for patient 
characteristics when evaluating clinic quality.   
Unsurprisingly, entrants have significantly lower market shares than incumbents; 
the coefficient on Wijt
1, the indicator variable that captures whether the clinic entered 
within the prior two years, is negative and strongly significant.  However, we find no 
evidence that the negative effect of being an entrant differed after the implementation of 
public reporting.  We interpret this as evidence that the ability to identify potential 
providers of ART was not a primary benefit of public reporting.  In addition, the results 
                                                 
10 The percent change is 0.126 = (exp(0.506*0.24) - 1).   16
provide no evidence that consumers interpreted the expected quality of entrants 
negatively relative to reporting incumbents due to the provision of information on 
reporting incumbent quality.   
Results not presented in the table show that an incumbent's choice to be a non-
reporter is negatively associated with its market share; the coefficient estimate on Vijt
2 is -
0.19, although not statistically significant (standard error 0.151).  However, this effect is 
smaller than the effect of being an entrant (-0.908).  As above, we find no evidence that 
the introduction of public reporting changed the effect of being a non-reporter.  The 
variables measuring market structure have the expected effects – clinics with more 
competitors, either incumbents or entrants, have lower market share. 
Column (2) presents results from a similarly-restricted version of equation (1a) 
that uses the log of the number of cycles in a clinic as the dependent variable, controlling 
for the number of cycles in the MSA.  The results of this specification are nearly identical 
to those using the log of market share as the dependent variable.   
Although the results in Table 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that consumers 
responded to the information on the quality report card, they do not preclude the 
possibility that the change in responsiveness of market share to quality was due to a 
general increase over time in consumers’ use of quality information.  Our "report card" or 
treatment period is later in time than our control period, and consumers may have become 
more sensitive to ART quality as the technology changed and became more widely used, 
even in the absence of the report card. 
In Table 4, we explore this issue by examining the effects of both one- and three-
year lagged performance on clinic market share, i.e., estimating unrestricted versions of   17
equations (1) and (1a) that include Wijt.  Because the one-year lagged birth rate was never 
disseminated through the report card, its correlation with market share should represent 
only the effects of non-report card sources of information on clinic quality.  The one-year 
lagged birth rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on market share in the 
pre-report card period, and this effect remained roughly constant in the post-report-card 
period (Column (1)).  This result supports the hypothesis that consumers have other 
sources of quality information that are correlated with measured performance that they 
use when choosing among clinics.   
However, even after accounting for these other sources of information, the public 
dissemination of the report card influences market share.  Controlling for the one-year 
lagged birthrate and its interaction with the post-report-card period indicator, the three-
year lagged birth rate has a positive and statistically significant incremental effect on 
market share -- but only in the post-report-card period.  While consumers continued to 
use alternative sources of information when choosing among clinics, this result is 
evidence that information on the report card has an independent effect.   
We find no evidence of a significant effect of either one- or three-year lagged 
patient age in the pre-report card period.  However, three-year lagged patient age has a 
statistically significant negative effect on market share after report cards relative to 
before.  Even after controlling for an up-to-date measure of a clinic's patient mix, the 
outdated measure matters -- but only after it was publicly disclosed to consumers.       
Table 5 investigates whether the effects of the report card varied between states 
with and without mandates requiring insurers to include comprehensive coverage of the 
treatment of infertility in health insurance policies.  The coefficient on the triple   18
interaction lagged birthrate*mandate*after 1997 allows us to test whether the effect of 
public reporting differed between states with and without comprehensive insurance 
mandates.  Our results indicate that this is indeed the case.  The effect of the three-year 
lagged birth rate in the post-reporting period is larger in states with mandates than in 
states without mandates.  While we continue to find a strong negative effect of a 
disproportionate number of relatively easy-to-treat patients in the post-reporting period, 
the results do not indicate that the effect differs between clinics in states with and without 
mandates.  
Three possible explanations exist for a stronger response to quality information in 
states with mandated insurance coverage.  First, insurer rather than consumer choice may 
be the primary mechanism by which patients are steered to higher quality providers.  In 
states with mandated insurance coverage, more consumers are insured and insurers may 
direct their enrollees to clinics based on the information in the report card.  Second, the 
incremental patients who receive ART in a mandate state may be those who would have 
been less informed through informal channels in the absence of a report card.  By 
extending insurance coverage to a broader population, comprehensive mandates induce 
those for whom the expected benefits of infertility treatment are relatively low to seek 
treatment (Bundorf, Henne et al. 2007).  The reduction in search costs created by the 
report card may have a larger effect on their decision making than those who seek 
treatment in the absence of generous insurance coverage.  Third, the incremental patients 
who receive ART in a mandate state may be more responsive to quality.  Because they 
are insured, they are less likely to trade off quality against price when choosing a 
provider.     19
The other coefficients in this model are more consistent with the latter two 
interpretations.  Notably, the three-year lagged birth rate has a positive and statistically 
significant pre-report card effect in states without mandates; the pre-report card effect in 
states with mandates is statistically significantly smaller, which is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that insurers serve as the vehicle through which quality information affects the 
allocation of patients to providers.   Instead, the fact that the three-year lagged birthrate 
has a statistically significant smaller pre-report-card effect in mandate states suggests that 
patients in mandate states are either less informed, or less willing to trade off quality for 
price, or both. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimate the responsiveness of the market share of fertility 
clinics to the public disclosure of information on their birth rate.  We find that public 
reporting of quality affects clinic market share in an economically important way in the 
market for ART.  The implementation of mandatory quality reporting caused fertility 
clinics reporting better outcomes than their competitors to gain market share relative to 
their competitors.  Although the lack of evidence that existing report cards have had a 
dramatic effect on consumer decision-making has led some health services researchers to 
argue that quality report cards are of marginal importance (Schauffler and Mordavsky 
2001), our results suggest otherwise. 
The divergence between the findings of our study and those of others may be due 
to particular characteristics of this market.  First, the performance measures for fertility 
clinics may either be more informative or easier to understand than those used in other   20
settings.  For example, in the case of health plan report cards, some have suggested that 
consumer response has been muted due to limitations in the way the information is 
presented (Hibbard, Harris-Kojetin et al. 2000; Vaiana and McGlynn 2002), a lack of 
understanding on the part of consumers of the meaning of the reported measures 
(Hibbard and Hewett 1997), and the possibility that the measures provide relatively little 
information on the dimensions of plan quality that are both unobservable and important 
to consumers (Bundorf and Baker 2007).  In the case of fertility clinics, in contrast, the 
main performance measure (births per cycle) is easy to understand and highly relevant to 
patients.   
Second, consumers may place less value on or have less access to sources of 
information other than the report card in this context than in others.  In the case of report 
cards for cardiovascular care, for example, some have proposed that they have little effect 
on patient choices because patients place greater weight on physician referrals than 
outcomes from a report card when making decisions (Schneider and Epstein 1998).  
Patients pursuing ART, in contrast, are likely to have less established relationships with 
either referring physician or fertility clinics, increasing the relative importance of the 
information presented in the report card.    
  Third, public reporting of information was mandatory on the part of providers in 
this market.  In the market for commercial HMOs, a setting examined by many of the 
existing studies of consumer response to quality information, participation by health 
plans in quality reporting and dissemination of the information by employers were both  
voluntary.  Quality information is only available for a subset of potential health insurance 
products, and only a subset of employers disseminate this type of information to workers.    21
In the setting we examine, in contrast, quality information was available for the vast 
majority of providers and consumers were not restricted to a subset of providers when 
making their choice. 
Finally, the consumers in this context differ from those in other studies.  Patients 
seeking treatment for infertility are disproportionately young, wealthy, and more highly 
educated than the population as a whole (Bitler and Schmidt 2006).  Thus, they may be 
more receptive and better able to understand the information available in the report card.  
In addition, ART is generally an elective, rather than an emergent procedure, providing 
patients with the opportunity to seek out information on provider quality.        
We also find that the benefits of report cards are particularly large to "marginal" 
consumers of health services.  The effects of report cards on the relationship between 
quality and market share are statistically significantly larger in places where ART 
coverage is mandated than in places where it is not.  This is likely because the consumers 
who would not have obtained ART in the absence of the mandate were either less 
informed, or less price sensitive, than their inframarginal counterparts.  Although we can 
not definitively identify the mechanism through which this effect occurs, it has important 
policy implications.  If report cards are more important to consumers pulled in to health 
services markets by mandates, then current health policy reforms that seek to expand 
insurance coverage should also be sure to provide an appropriate source of information 
for the newly-insured the reforms create. 
Overall, our findings indicate that report cards in this market have the potential to 
influence provider behavior.  Because consumers responded to information on clinic 
quality, they created strong incentives for clinics to improve their scores.  Clinics,   22
however, may improve measured performance either by increasing the quality of their 
services or by selecting good prognosis patients.  While our findings create concern over 
the possibility that quality reporting may create incentives for providers to engage in 
patient selection, they also demonstrate the potential for this type of difficulty to be 
overcome.  Even very simple risk adjustment -- such as publication of raw shares of 
younger patients – mutes these incentives on the part of providers.  Whether fertility 
clinics were able to improve their scores, without a corresponding reduction in market 
share, by selecting patients based on characteristics that were not publicly reported 
remains an important question.  Also, because the effect of age on probability of 
conception is well-known in this case, the ability of patients to effectively incorporate 
this information into their decision-making may not be generalizable to more complex 
medical treatments.   
Alternatively, clinics may have improved their scores by increasing the quality of 
care they provide to patients.  While birth rates improved over the period of our study 
(CDC 1997; CDC 2006), it is clearly not possible, in the absence of more detailed 
analyses, to attribute this to quality reporting since the public reporting mandate occurred 
contemporaneously with improvements in ART technology as well as a dramatic increase 
in the size of the population pursuing treatment.  The effect of report cards on quality, 
through their effects on market share, remains an important topic for future research. 
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Figure 1:  Sample clinic report from 1995 
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Table 1:  Growth in the Market for Assisted Reproductive Therapies, 1996-2003 
 
 U.S.  MSAs with Two or 
More Clinics 
Variable 1996 2003 1996 2003 
       
Total Number of Reporting Clinics  300  398  242  337 
        
Total Number of Non-Reporting Clinics  28  45  20  35 
            Identified in Report Card  14  35  8  28 
            Not Identified in Report Card  14  10  12  7 
        
Total Cycles Initiated  49,600  86,753  43,476  76,886 
        
Number of MSAs  120  164  60  67 
        
Average Number of Clinics per MSA  2.73  3.31  4.37  5.55   27




Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Market share  0.214 0.236 0.000  0.974
Birth rate  0.252 0.098 0.000  0.800
% patients under age 40  0.903 0.072 0.500  1.000
Entrant 0.210 0.407 0.000  1.000
Non-reporter   0.058 0.234 0.000  1.000
Physicians per capita in MSA (000s)  3.316 0.104 1.500  11.268
MSA population (000s)  1,038.879 1,610.441 51.323  6,414.636
Number of ART clinics in MSA  12.089 11.929 2.000  45.000
Mandate state  0.132 0.338 0.000  1.000
Teaching hospital  0.182 0.386 0.000  1.000
Member of SART  0.948 0.222 0.000  1.000
Accepts single women  0.833 0.373 0.000  1.000
Accepts gestational carriers  0.542 0.498 0.000  1.000
Accepts egg donors  0.587 0.492 0.000  1.000
      
Notes:  Number of clinic-years=2,428;  Number of unique clinics=424.  Sample includes 
ART providers in MSAs with at least two clinics during the period 1996 to 2003. 
   28
Table 3:  Effect of Birth Rate, Patient Age, and Other Characteristics, 




Independent variables cycles in MSA) ln(# cycles)
3-year lagged birth rate Z-score*After 1997 0.506 ** 0.508 **
(0.236) (0.235)
3-year lagged birthrate Z-score 0.150 0.146
(0.149) (0.148)
3-year lagged patient age Z-score*After 1997 -2.028 *** -2.029 ***
(0.760) (0.766)
3-year lagged patient age Z-score 0.908 0.926
(0.624) (0.633)
Entrant*After 1997 0.045 0.038
(0.132) (0.132)
Entrant -0.826 *** -0.810 ***
(0.089) (0.085)
ln(# incumbents) -0.962 *** -0.745 ***
(0.062) (0.068)
ln(#entrants) -0.229 *** -0.152 ***
(0.050) (0.055)
No incumbents -0.012 -0.092
(0.121) (0.104)
No entrants 0.326 *** 0.238 ***
(0.076) (0.066)
ln(# cycles in MSA) 0.787 ***
(0.052)
Number of observations 2,428 2,428
R-squared 0.64 0.36  
 
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Standard errors calculated allowing for correlation within MSA over time.  All models 
control for additional clinic characteristics including whether the clinic is affiliated with 
a teaching hospital, SART membership, whether the clinic accepts single women, whether 
the clinic accepts egg donors, whether the clinic accepts gestational carriers, whether a 
clinic is a non-reporting incumbent and the interaction of these characteristics with an 
(After 1997) indicator.  All models also control for additional market characteristics 
including the ln(number of non-reporting incumbents), an indicator of no non-reporting 
incumbents, an indicator of whether the MSA includes a non-reporting clinic,  ln(number 
of physicians in the MSA), ln(MSA population) and the interaction of each of these with 
an (After 1997) indicator. Z-scores are defined as (clinic mean-MSA mean)/MSA mean. 
Patient age Z-score is the clinic's proportion of patients aged 40 or younger (aged 39 or 
younger for 1993-1996) relative to the MSA average proportion.   29
Table 4:  Effect of 3-Year versus 1-Year Lagged Birthrate and Patient Age, 




Independent variables cycles in MSA) ln(# cycles)
3-year lagged birth rate Z-score*after 1997 0.465 ** 0.465 **
(0.200) (0.196)
3-year lagged birth rate Z-score -0.025 -0.027
(0.154) (0.154)
1-year lagged birth rate*After 1997 -0.086 -0.083
(0.181) (0.180)
1-year lagged birth rate 0.648 *** 0.643 ***
(0.179) (0.175)
3-year lagged patient age*After 1997 -1.595 ** -1.607 **
(0.639) (0.628)
3-year lagged patient age 0.813 0.837
(0.531) (0.523)
1-year lagged patient age*After 1997 -0.907 -0.881
(0.755) (0.754)
1-year lagged patient age -0.497 -0.507
(0.641) (0.636)
Entrant*After 1997 0.078 0.071
(0.141) (0.139)
Entrant -0.840 *** -0.823 ***
(0.121) (0.119)
ln(# incumbents) -0.961 *** -0.747 ***
(0.081) (0.105)
ln(# entrants) -0.229 *** -0.154
(0.086) (0.097)
No incumbents -0.021 -0.101
(0.603) (0.602)
No entrants 0.311 *** 0.224 *
(0.118) (0.118)
ln(# cycles in MSA) 0.790 ***
(0.091)
Number of observations 2,428 2,428
R-squared 0.66 0.39  
 
Note: see table 2.  30
Table 5:  Effect of Birth Rate and Patient Age, 
Before versus After Report Cards Were Introduced in 1998, 




Independent variables cycles in MSA) ln(# cycles)
3-year lagged birth rate*Mandate state*After 1997 1.291 * 1.284 *
(0.675) (0.679)
3-year lagged birth rate*Mandate state -0.541 ** -0.532 **
(0.266) (0.265)
3-year lagged birth rate*After 1997 0.224 0.232
(0.184) (0.183)
3-year lagged birth rate 0.299 * 0.291 *
(0.157) (0.156)
3-year lagged age*Mandate state*After 1997 -3.102 -3.114
(2.553) (2.557)
3-year lagged age*Mandate state 0.453 0.455
(0.945) (0.947)
3-year lagged age*After 1997 -1.349 *** -1.344 ***
(0.424) (0.427)
3-year lagged age 0.626 0.629
(0.632) (0.635)
Mandate state*After 1997 7.149 16.560
(63.298) (66.505)
Mandate state -0.406 -10.230
(64.394) (67.645)
ln(# cycles in MSA) 0.820 ***
(0.043)
Number of observations 2,428 2,428
R-squared 0.65 0.37  
 
Note: see table 2.  Models in this table also control for entrant (open <3 years), after 1997*entrant, 
ln(# incumbents in MSA), ln(# entrants in MSA), no incumbents in MSA indicator, and no entrants in 
MSA indicator.  In addition, the models include the interaction of all clinic and market characteristics 
with both the mandate indicator and the mandate and (After 1997) interaction.    
  
 